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Abstract
This paper defends Fairbairn’s charge that Calvin’s theology is implicitly pantheistic. It 
is argued that Calvin’s model of divine sovereignty entails occasionalism, which in turn 
necessitates pantheism via the Eleatic Principle. That this problem is not contrived is also 
illustrated by means of an examination of the metaphysics of Jonathan Edwards. However, 
while the problem to which Fairbairn drew our attention is particularly visible in Calvin’s 
theology, it is argued that the same defect is present in all forms of nominalist theism. The 
fundamental problem is not Calvin’s claim that God is the sole efficient cause; rather, in saying 
this, Calvin merely made explicit what is, in fact, implicit in all forms of nominalist theism, 
and thereby made the line of argument concluding in pantheism slightly more succinct. The 
real issue is the fact that nominalist theism makes efficient causation the only ontological 
bridge between the Creator and the creation. Efficient causation is not capable of serving 
this role. Only the Platonic doctrine of participation is capable of relating the Creator to the 
created order in a manner which maintains the integrity of both domains.
Keywords
Calvinism, nominalism, Platonism, causation, theism, Eleatic Principle
“Calvin was as pure, though not as conscious and consistent a Pantheist as 
Spinoza.” 1
“Spinoza  . . . may be said to have perfected and reduced to philosophical 
consistency the Calvinistic conception of Deity.”2
Andrew M. Fairbairn, 
The Place of Christ in Modern Theology
1 Andrew M. Fairbairn, The Place of Christ in Modern Theology (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1893), 164 (scanned PDF copy of original 
publication from Princeton Theological Seminary Library available from https://archive.org/details/placnm00fair, downloaded 3/6/2016). 
2 Fairbairn, Place of Christ, 165–6.
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“But being in order is all that we call God, who is, and there is none else 
besides Him.”3
Jonathan Edwards,  Miscellanies
“Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived.”4
Baruch Spinoza, Ethics
Introduction
In his 1893 classic, The Place of Christ in Modern Theology, Andrew Fairbairn made a 
startling claim, that the most orthodox of Protestants, John Calvin, was implicitly a pantheist. 
He claimed that the only difference between Calvin’s conception of deity, and that of Spinoza, 
was that the latter was more logically consistent.5 Fairbairn, of course, did not say that Calvin 
was an explicit pantheist. Calvin never overtly embraced pantheism; at a conscious level his 
confession of faith was robustly opposed to the doctrine. The charge that Fairbairn made, 
however, is that whatever Calvin’s conscious intentions, an unwitting consequence of 
Calvin’s doctrine of God is that the distinction between the Creator and the creation, upon 
which he placed so much emphasis, must ultimately collapse altogether.
The basic problem in Calvin’s thought, according to Fairbairn, relates to his central 
theme of the absolute sovereignty of God.6 As the Reformed evangelical writers Sproul, 
Gerstner, and Lindsley put it: “There is no disputing the fact that Calvin did not claim to be 
a pantheist. The great question of Fairbairn is, if Calvin maintained that there is only one 
efficient will in the universe, how could he be anything other than an implicit pantheist?”7
Calvin’s problem with pantheism, as understood by Fairbairn, is a corollary of his 
claim that God is the sole efficient will. It is a product of how Calvin conceives of God’s 
sovereignty in metaphysical terms. An obvious comeback to which defenders of Calvin can 
resort, therefore, is to appeal to his doctrine of secondary causation. Calvin unambiguously 
affirmed the reality of secondary causes.8 He was not, at least not explicitly, an occasionalist. 
On this basis, some defenders of Calvin have argued that Fairbairn’s objection is based on a 
crude misreading. For example, Warfield accuses Fairbairn of having “miss[ed] his [Calvin’s] 
meaning altogether.”9 The question is, however, whether Calvin’s affirmation of the reality of 
3 Jonathan Edwards, The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards, From His Private Notebooks, ed. H.G. Townsend (Eugene: University of Oregon 
Press, 1955), 74.
4 Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), trans. R.H.M. Elwes (Project Gutenberg, 2003), https://www.
gutenberg.org/files/3800/3800-h/3800-h.htm,, accessed 17/4/2017, part 1, proposition 15.
5 Fairbairn, Place of Christ, 164–6.
6 Fairbairn, Place of Christ, 164–6.
7 R.C. Sproul, J. Gerstner, and A. Lindsley, Classical Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Academie Books/Zondervan, 1984), 294.
8 He writes, “the Christian will not overlook inferior [i.e. secondary] causes.” John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry 
Beveridge (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 191 (I.17.9).
9 Benjamin B. Warfield, “Calvin’s Doctrine of God,” The Princeton Theological Review 7 (1909), 381–436.
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secondary causes is logically consistent with his views about the nature of divine sovereignty. 
This question will be explored in this paper. That there is a real problem in Calvin’s thought in 
this respect, which is not merely a contrivance on the part of his opponents, will be illustrated 
by considering the trajectory of the thought of Jonathan Edwards, the most metaphysically 
rigorous of Calvin’s successors.
In this paper, it will be argued that the problem to which Fairbairn draws our attention, 
is not, in fact, specific to Calvinism. Rather, the fundamental problem is a consequence of 
nominalism with respect to the transcendent. That is, it will be argued that this problem of 
a collapse into pantheism is inherent not only to Calvinism, but to all forms of nominalist 
theism, including Arminian versions of this ontology (such as the Molinist nominalist theism 
of William Lane Craig).10 It is only because Calvin happens to have presented the central 
thesis of nominalist theism with uncompromising force and clarity (that God is “entirely 
other”),11 that the charge of pantheism has been levelled against him. Nominalist theism 
attempts to bridge the Creator-creation gap by relying on efficient causation. That is why 
God’s causal agency is so strongly emphasised in Calvin. Nominalist theism has left no other 
ontological bridge between God and the creation except for efficient causation. As it turns 
out, this bridge is not strong enough to carry the weight that must be placed on it, resulting in 
an inevitable catastrophic failure in which the two domains merge into one. It will be argued 
that the only real solution to this problem, which enables a genuine distinction between the 
Creator and the creation to be retained in a stable manner, is a return to “realism with respect 
to the transcendent”; that is, to participatory theism, or Platonism. 
Four Kinds of God
At this point, it may be helpful to distinguish, in broadbrush terms, four main positions 
regarding the relation of God to the created order. This relates to the question of divine 
immanence, but it must be borne in mind that there are various ways in which immanence can 
be fleshed out. Even if it is denied that God is present ontologically in the world, a doctrine of 
immanence might be proposed which is centred around causation rather than being, and/or 
which asserts God’s presence in the world in some other way. So here we are concerned not 
with immanence in a broad sense, but only with “ontological immanence.” Here, then, are the 
four main possible positions:
1. Nominalist theism: God is not in the world, the world is not in God
2. Participatory theism: God is (in a limited manner) in the world, the world is 
not in God
3. Panentheism: God is (in a limited manner) in the world, the world is 
(completely) in God
4. Pantheism: God is (completely) in the world, the world is (completely) in God.
10 William L. Craig, God Over All: Divine Aseity and the Challenge of Platonism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
11 C. M. N. Eire, War Against the Idols: The Reformation of Worship from Erasmus to Calvin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 197.
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Participatory theism is merely another term for Platonism.12 It is necessary, however, to say 
something more about nominalist theism. The basic assertion of nominalist theism is that 
God is “entirely other”13 to the created order. This means that whatever it is that grounds 
universals in the created realm metaphysically, these grounds are wholly confined to the 
created realm, and are not eternal or grounded in the divine. That is, nominalist theism 
involves a denial of the Platonic theory of Forms. It is possible for a nominalist theist to be 
realist with respect to universals in the created realm. More consistently, a nominalist theist 
might be a nominalist in a general sense. But what justifies the phrase “nominalist theism” is 
that all these kinds of theories maintain a nominalism with respect to the transcendent.
To explain further what is meant by “nominalism with respect to the transcendent,” 
we might begin by observing that there are some predicates which are routinely employed to 
describe both God and the created order. For example, “is righteous.” We might say “Job was 
righteous,” but we also say, “God is righteous.” The key feature of nominalist theism is that it 
is nominalist in how it treats the two predicates in this kind of case. Whatever justifies the use 
of the predicate metaphysically when applied to God, and whatever establishes the predicate 
when applied to a creature, those grounds cannot be the same real universal instantiated 
in both cases. Otherwise, given that God is righteous by nature, we have a universal which 
is eternal and uncreated, but which is also instantiated in the created order; and that just 
takes us back to the idea of participation. While nominalist theism may not necessarily 
be nominalist in general terms, it is nominalist in terms of how it relates the created order 
to God. The nominalism in question is a vertical nominalism (God/creation), and not 
necessarily a horizontal one (creation/creation). And this is what justifies the use of the term 
“nominalist theism.” Nominalist theism maintains a strict “Creator-creature distinction.”14 It 
is for this reason that there really are no mediating positions between participatory theism 
and nominalist theism, in the way that there are mediating positions in relation to the general 
problem of universals, between Platonic realism15 and nominalism.16
Calvin, Nominalist Theism, and Divine Immanence
The Magisterial Reformation was influenced by medieval nominalism from the outset. Luther 
studied under a number of nominalist philosophers, and was deeply impressed by William 
of Ockham and his nominalist critique of Aristotle. 17 Some have argued that Zwingli’s 
thought is thoroughly imbued with Ockhamism.18 Calvin was also heavily influenced by the 
12 On Plato’s theism, see Eugenio Benitez, “The Good or the Demiurge: Causation and the Unity of Good in Plato,” Apeiron 28 (1995), 113–40.
13 Eire, War Against the Idols, 197.
14 Cornelius Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, ed. W. Edgar (Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 2007), 72. 
15 The Platonist position regarding universals is traditionally called “realism” in this context. See Nicholas Wolterstorff, On Universals: An 
Essay in Ontology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 106, 169–70.
16 See for instance, David M. Armstrong, Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989). The term “nominalist” 
can be used in a historical sense to refer to a particular school of fourteenth-century medieval scholastic theology, or in an analytic 
philosophical sense to refer to a certain type of doctrine concerning the nature of universals. These terms overlap, however, because the 
historical nominalists were the first to formulate the theory which is now known as nominalism in a philosophical sense.
17 Sproul, Gerstner, and Lindsley, Classical Apologetics, 197.
18 W.P. Stephens, The Theology of Huldrych Zwingli (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 6.
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medieval nominalists,19 whose thought was almost in the air that was breathed in the French 
universities at the time. It was the nominalists who stressed God’s sovereignty and freedom, 
both central themes in Calvin.20 But given the broad impact of nominalism on the magisterial 
reformers, why specifically select Calvin as the archetypal representative of nominalist 
theism? The answer lies in the radical insistence found in Calvin that God is “entirely other,”21 
and his insistence, in opposition to Lutheranism, on the principle finitum non capax infiniti.22 
In other words, it is in Calvin that the “Creator-creature distinction” reaches its zenith. 
Regardless of influences, therefore, it is in Calvin’s actual doctrine of God that we find 
nominalist theism most rigorously and absolutely expressed.23 Luther and his successors, by 
way of contrast, muddy the waters with the idea that the finite can contain the infinite, which 
enables divinity to reside ontologically in ordinary everyday created entities, and therefore 
allows a “Creator-creature overlap.”
Before moving on, it is necessary to say something about Calvin’s doctrine of divine 
immanence. Calvin’s dominant way of presenting God as engaged with creation is to use the 
concept of efficient causation, or, in other words, in terms of omnipotence. Calvin is emphatic 
that God is causally in control of everything, everywhere. Whenever God’s presence in the 
world is discussed, it is most frequently in terms of the divine will causally determining 
events and things in the created realm, bringing them into being or changing them, either 
directly, or by means of secondary causes.24 However, as a less prominent theme, Calvin also 
characterises immanence with reference to divine omnipresence. He insists that all three 
persons of the Trinity are present in their fullness everywhere, and that God “fill[s] all things 
in an invisible manner.”25 The problem is that, because they are not ontologically elucidated, 
it is challenging to see what these claims actually mean in metaphysical terms, given Calvin’s 
radical cleavage between the Creator and the creation. We have in Calvin’s writings only 
a few spatial allusions (such as that God “fills” all things, or is “present” at every spatial 
location).26 However, he seems to explicitly undercut every possible ontological ground for 
understanding such statements (by asserting that God is “entirely other,” and that the finite 
cannot contain the infinite).
This problem is perhaps best brought out by considering the problem of divine 
omnipresence in Cartesian thought, where it has received much more attention. By 
characterising the material universe in terms of extension, and minds in terms of thought, 
19 See A.E. McGrath, “John Calvin and Late Medieval Thought. A Study in Late Medieval Influences upon Calvin’s Theological 
Thought,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 77 (1986), 58–78. Also S.M. Heim, “The Powers of God: Calvin and Late Medieval Thought,” 
Andover Newton Quarterly 19 (1979), 156–66.
20 Heim, “Power of God,” 157.
21 Eire, War Against the Idols, 197.
22 Calvin does not explicitly affirm this principle, but it is implicit in his attack on the Lutheran understanding of the Eucharist: “Let no 
property be assigned to his body inconsistent with his human nature. This is done when it is either said to be infinite, or made to occupy a 
variety of places at the same time.” Institutes, 571 (IV.17.19).
23 It remains a matter of dispute whether Calvin was a nominalist in a general sense. Whether he was or not, he clearly was a nominalist with 
respect to the transcendent, i.e., a nominalist theist.
24 See the Institutes, 175–6 (I.16.4); and the examples in Heim, “Power of God,” 158–9.
25 Calvin, Institutes, 583 (IV.17.29). See also I.13.1 (109–10).
26 Calvin, Institutes, 583 (IV.17.29), 109–10 (I.13.1).
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Descartes created a radical ontological “mind-matter distinction” that is an almost perfect 
analogue of Calvin’s “Creator-creature distinction.” As in Calvin, God and the material 
universe are “entirely other” for Descartes; the only difference is that for Descartes there 
are also other minds besides God which are similarly “entirely other” to the physical world. 
Thought and extension are, on Descartes’ view, absolutely distinct attributes, like chalk and 
cheese—or, to use Calvin’s famous contrast between God and humans, like fire and water.27 
This distinction caused no end of difficulty for Descartes and his successors—who of course 
intended their philosophy to be consistent with Christian orthodoxy—with respect to the 
doctrine of omnipresence.28 The problem is well summed up by Sir Isaac Newton, who 
wrote: “If we say with Descartes that extension is body, then . . . the distinction between mind 
and body in his philosophy becomes unintelligible, unless at the same time we say that the 
mind is in no way extended, and so is not substantially present to any extension, that is, exists 
nowhere.”29
Returning to the problem of omnipresence in Calvin, his defenders might respond 
that the words he used to describe God’s presence in spatial terms are being employed only 
analogously.30 That, however, is not the problem. As I have discussed elsewhere, Platonists 
also speak analogously of metaphysical realities.31 The problem with Calvin’s view is that 
there does not seem to be any metaphysical content with which to “pad out” the analogy. It 
is a “thin analogy,” which asserts that in some mysterious way God is entirely other, but yet 
is also spatially related to the creation; and that the finite cannot contain the infinite, but yet 
finite space contains at every point an infinite God. Whereas for the Platonist, the analogy 
is “rich” and can be extensively expanded and elucidated ontologically using the doctrine of 
participation and the formal/eminent distinction.32
Jonathan Edwards As a Case Study of the Collapse into 
Pantheism
The challenges that nominalist theism encounters in elaborating a doctrine of divine 
omnipresence, points to its primary weakness: how to relate the two distinct realms of God 
and the creation. That this is so can be seen by following the line of argument that led, in the 
realm of philosophy, from Descartes to Spinoza, and which came perilously close to being 
followed through upon within Calvinism in the thought of Jonathan Edwards. Edwards was 
forced to conclude that “God is the only real substance,”33 and that God is “in effect being in 
27 John Calvin, Commentary on the Gospel According to John, vol. 1, trans. W. Pringle (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956), comments on John 4:24.
28 J. W. Reid, “The Spatial Presence of Spirits among the Cartesians,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (2008), 91–117.
29 Newton, De Gravitatione, quoted in Robert Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes 1274–1671 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011), 330–1.
30 As an example of this defence in another context, see M.S. Horton, “Hellenistic or Hebrew? Open Theism and Reformed Theological 
Method,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 45 (2002), 317–41. 
31 Albert R. Haig, “Modernity, ‘Radical Orthodoxy,’ and Cornelius Van Til: A Journey of Rediscovery of Participatory Theism,” Colloquium 47 
(2015), 257–73.
32 In the Platonist view, extension is contained eminently in God, but not formally.
33 William S. Morris, The Young Jonathan Edwards: A Reconstruction (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2005), 347.
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general.”34 In saying this, Edwards seems to have virtually affirmed pantheism, since there 
is barely a hair’s breadth between saying that “God is the only real substance,” and saying 
“God is the only substance.” The latter formula, of course, is explicit pantheism and the 
catchcry of Spinoza (“Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived” ).35 Indeed, 
astonishingly for those who know Edwards only as an orthodox Calvinist revivalist, in his 
private notebooks (the Miscellanies) he employs the scripture-derived phrase “Thou art, and 
there is none beside thee,” not to show that God is the only god, but that God is the only 
true thing that exists.36 Repeatedly, he seems to affirm positions which are hard to construe as 
anything but pantheistic.37 For example, in discussing a human reflecting on one of their own 
thoughts (with the Cartesian cogito ergo sum perhaps in the back of his mind), he writes of the 
ontological basis of that thought:
But if we say ‘tis the substance of the soul, if we mean that there is some substance 
besides that thought that brings that thought forth, if it be God, I acknowledge it; 
but if there be meant something else that has no properties, it seems to me absurd. 
If the removal of all properties, such as extension, solidity, thought, etc., leaves 
nothing, it seems to me that no substance is anything besides them; for if there be 
anything besides, there might remain something when these are removed.38
A very plausible interpretation of this passage is that Edwards is arguing here that there is 
no substance except God, and that everything else (all other “substances,” including human 
souls, material objects, and so forth) are merely aggregates of properties or attributes within 
that one substance. That is precisely the doctrine of Spinoza. While it seems amazing that 
a Calvinist theologian would affirm the teachings of Spinoza, there seems no satisfactory 
alternative explanation for the texts.
Wainwright has defended Edwards against the charge of pantheism by asserting 
that for Edwards the relation between God and the world involved “creative volition and 
its immediate effects.”39 However, even the arch-pantheist Spinoza speaks repeatedly of 
God and the world in terms of agent causality.40 Furthermore, Wainwright himself admits 
that Edwards was an explicit occasionalist.41 Since, as outlined below, occasionalism entails 
pantheism, if Edwards wasn’t a pantheist, he should have been.
34 William J. Wainwright, “Edwards, Jonathan,” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed., ed. R. Audi (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 253.
35 Spinoza, Ethics, part 1, proposition 14.
36 Derived from 1 Samuel 2:2. Jonathan Edwards, Miscellanies, cited in Morris, Young Jonathan Edwards, 347.
37 Edwards’s natural philosophy centred on the idea that “the world is one organic whole; though of necessity a tight system, it is not a 
mechanism; it is the continuous ordered creative expression of the one proper substance, the one true being, from whom all things take 
their origin. For he is, and there is nought else beside.” Morris, Young Jonathan Edwards, 348.
38 Edwards, Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards, 78.
39 William J. Wainwright, “Jonathan Edwards,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), ed. E. N. Zalta, http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/edwards/, accessed 17/4/2017.
40 “God is the sole free cause,” “God is the cause of those things which are in him,” “God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not 
constrained by anyone,” etc. Spinoza, Ethics, part 1.
41 In Edwards’s writings, “the doctrine of God’s absolute sovereignty is explicated by occasionalism.” Wainwright, Cambridge Dictionary of 
Philosophy, 253.
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Step One: Secondary Causes and Occasionalism
The doctrine of occasionalism states that everything that happens is caused by God’s 
direct action to make it happen. So, striking a match does not cause fire; rather, God reliably 
produces fire whenever matches are struck. The striking of the match is an “occasion” for God 
to act in producing fire. On this view, the laws of nature are just descriptions of regularities 
in God’s actions.42 Calvin, as has already been noted, explicitly denies occasionalism.43 We 
must keep in mind, however, that the issue is not what Calvin actually affirmed (he clearly 
was not an explicit occasionalist), but is rather, what is logically entailed by his core doctrinal 
commitments. It is worth noting, however, that even in Calvin’s overt declarations about 
causality, commentators have found echoes of occasionalism: “At times, however, he so 
stresses God’s direct action as to sound almost like an occasionalist. He argues for instance 
that though we are nourished by bread, it is not the bread itself which nourishes us but ‘God’s 
secret blessing.’”44 The problem arises because of Calvin’s insistence that God’s will is the 
sole efficient cause.45 Heim writes that “He insists that all individual events are directly willed 
by God . . . For Calvin, the potentia absoluta does not only ‘indicate what God could have done 
but what he actually does.’”46
Calvin’s view that God is the sole efficient cause logically excludes secondary causation, 
despite his desire to retain secondary causes within his system. However, denying that God 
is the sole efficient cause, and arguing for secondary causation that is truly independent of 
God in the created realm, does not solve the problem either; indeed, this was the position 
of Descartes, who wanted his philosophy to provide scope for a mechanistic conception of 
the physical universe. Calvin and Descartes are caught on the horns of a dilemma; although 
neither were explicit occasionalists, either approach results in a collapse into occasionalism. 
That this is so can be illustrated by the fact that Calvin’s most philosophically literate 
successor, Jonathan Edwards, adopted an explicit occasionalism,47 as did Descartes’ most 
important successor, Nicolas Malebranche.48
The problem with secondary causation for nominalist theism is as follows. Suppose, 
in the created realm, that A causes B. Did God will that both A should happen, and also, 
B? Calvin emphatically replied “yes”; whereas Descartes replied, “not necessarily.” Either 
answer is problematic. To begin with Calvin, the essential problem is that God, in Calvin’s 
view, is omnipotent. If God wills that A should happen, and B should happen, that is in and 
of itself a sufficient condition for both happening. Any further cause would be redundant, 
42 Occasionalism developed originally in the context of medieval Islamic theology, from which it spread into European thought via Nicholas 
of Autrecourt in the first half of the fourteenth century. It re-emerged amongst the Cartesians, although Descartes himself was not an 
occasionalist. See Sukjae Lee, “Occasionalism,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta, https://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/occasionalism/, accessed 27/8/2017.
43 Calvin, Institutes, 191 (I.17.9).
44 Heim, “Power of God,” 158.
45 Sproul et al., Classical Apologetics, 293.
46 Heim, “Power of God,” 159.
47 Wainwright, Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 253.
48 Nicolas Malebranche, Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion, trans. M. Ginsberg (London: Routledge, 2013), 51–61.
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and unnecessary (it would represent “causal overdetermination”).49 This would mean that all 
secondary causes were superfluous; if they were removed from the system, everything would 
still unfold in an identical manner. What sense is there, under such conditions, to even say 
such causes exist? They have no discernible impact upon anything.
One might argue that God wills that B should happen, not directly, but by means of a 
secondary cause. An analogy might be that I might will something, but might choose to let 
someone else bring it about, rather than doing it myself. The problem with such analogies, 
however, is that they only make sense because I am not omnipotent. If everything I willed 
immediately came about, the option of doing it myself or finding some other means would 
never present itself. In willing for B to come about by means of secondary causes, it seems 
that God is still willing for it to come about;50 and therefore, its occurrence is guaranteed 
simply by virtue of divine omnipotence. There are only two options left for secondary causes 
to be viable. If A is the true secondary cause of B, then either God’s willing B is not efficacious 
in bringing B about (i.e. God is not omnipotent), or God does not will B, but only “permits” 
it to happen (which contradicts Calvin’s emphatic repeated assertions). It is to this second 
option, which Calvin rejected but Descartes adopted, which we now turn, to show that it, 
too, must lead to occasionalism.
Let us suppose, with Descartes, that there is true secondary causation, whereby A 
causes B, and God does not will B. There is one special case which needs to be considered 
separately: the will of free agents, since Descartes, unlike Calvin, held to a (quite radical)51 
doctrine of contra-causal free will. Leaving contra-causal free will aside for a moment, and 
dealing only with other causal interactions, the idea that God only “permits” such things to 
occur without willing them, seems incoherent. Suppose that A occurs and causes B, through 
physical causation (or the laws of nature, however one conceives of these). It is God, the 
Creator, who wills that the causal relation in question should hold (that events of type A 
should cause events of type B). Given that A occurs, God surely knows that the causal relation 
in question will produce B. So how could God will that A should produce B, and yet not be 
willing B, granted A? If a person wills something, they will everything that they know will 
certainly flow from that choice. There can be for God no “unintended consequences”; every 
consequence is foreseen (keep in mind that we are not speaking of free-will choices here, only 
of other instances of causation).52 Of course, God may not desire some of the consequences; 
but that is another matter. It seems, therefore, that Calvin was correct to assert that, under 
the kind of nominalist theistic system that he presupposed, God is the sole efficient cause. It 
49 Jaegwon Kim, “Causation,” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed., ed. R. Audi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
127.
50 The issue here is not the distinction which some Calvinists make between a “will of desire” and a “will of decree” in God, as in John Piper, 
“Are there two wills in God? Divine election and God’s desire for all to be saved,” in The Grace of God, the Bondage of the Will, vol. 1, ed. T. R. 
Schreiner and B. A. Ware (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1995), 107–31. The discussion here only involves God’s will of decree.
51 Descartes held that the will is always contra-causally free, in every single decision it makes. He wrote, “the will is by its nature so free that it 
can’t ever be constrained.” René Descartes, Passions of the Soul, trans. J. Bennett (Early Modern Texts, 2010), http://www.earlymoderntexts.
com/assets/pdfs/descartes1649.pdf, accessed 17/4/2017, part I, article 41.
52 Most theists who hold to contra-causal free will hold that God foreknows the choices of free agents anyway; but a few (so-called “open 
theists”) do not, hence the qualification here, so as to be as general as possible in the argument.
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is just that he was inconsistent in not drawing from this the required conclusion, namely, that 
secondary causation is an illusion, and that occasionalism is true. Indeed, the phrase “God is 
the sole efficient cause” is a perfect summary of the doctrine of occasionalism.
The issue of contra-causal free will, however, has not yet been addressed. There are, 
in the incompatibilist free will model, certain events (the choices of free agents) which have 
no causal antecedents. The line of argument above would not require us to suppose that God 
wills those choices.53 Such choices of free agents are the one exception to the rule. However, 
whatever flows from the choices of free will agents, God would have to will. Of course, this 
willing might be regretful, and only because God wishes for created free agents to have some 
genuine influence on the world (otherwise their freedom would be pointless). But in any 
case, we are left with only two options, both of them occasionalist. There is a deterministic 
option, in which everything that occurs is willed by God; and there is a libertarian option, in 
which everything except the choices of free agents is willed by God, those choices having 
no causal antecedents, but also having no efficacy, except by virtue of God’s will. But either 
approach is occasionalist.
Before moving on to step two of the argument, it is worthwhile summarising why 
Platonism avoids this dilemma. On the Platonist view, efficient causation is just an aspect 
or part of the structure of Form. Unlike nominalist theism, participatory theism may make 
use of formal causation as well as efficient causation. The universe as a whole participates 
in its Form, as does every individual thing or substance within the universe. The whole 
distinction between divine causation and secondary causation has to be recast. Something 
of God’s own being is emanated (Form), which interacts with (is “finitised” by) a principle 
of individuation.54 As a result, efficient causal relations are not ontologically “external” to 
God, since the Forms themselves remain divine. On this view, all efficient causal relationships 
within the universe are merely expressions of Form (temporality itself being an expression 
of Form, as is spatial extension). They occur “within” some Form or other. Efficient causal 
interactions between things or substances must be incorporated within some larger Form of 
which both are a part, which is why the universe as a whole must have a Form.55
In the Platonist view, there are not divine causal relations on the one hand, and 
secondary causal relations on the other. Rather, every efficient causal relationship is divine 
and secondary at the same time. Whether divine or secondary is the appropriate description 
in any given case depends on the frame of reference; that is, which Form in the “great chain 
of being” one is speaking of at the time. Whatever happens is both God’s actual willing and 
is also a secondary or “natural” causal relation. The “natural” causal relation participates in 
the divine willing, and may be said to be an instance of it. But it may equally be said to be 
53 Whether there is such a thing as contra-causal free will or not, is irrelevant to the present argument, and will not be addressed here.
54 How this principle of individuation, or Plotinian “matter” (hulē), came into existence is an extremely complex problem which cannot 
be addressed here. A genuinely theistic Platonism must avoid both the Scylla of panentheism, and the Charybdis of positing an ultimate 
dualism.
55 Hence the “soul of the All” (hē psuchē tou pantos) of Plotinus’s Enneads and Plato’s Philebus. Plotinus, Ennead IV, trans. A.H. Armstrong, 
Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 52–55 (IV.3.7); Plato, “Philebus,” in Plato: Complete Works, trans. 
D. Frede, ed. J. M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), 418 (30a–b).
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natural, in relation to the “lower” Form of which it is a structural component. Whether one 
speaks of a particular efficient causal relation as being divine or as being secondary is purely 
a function of the (implicit or explicit) perspective one is adopting; which Form one has in 
view when making the statement. Efficient causal relations can only be described relative to 
some Form, within which they inhere. Thus, the dichotomy created by nominalism, between 
divine and secondary causes, is abolished. In the words of Étienne Gilson, “we must hold 
firmly to two apparently contradictory truths. God does whatever creatures do; and that 
creatures themselves do whatever they do.”56 It is only participatory theism that can ground 
this apparent contradiction in a coherent metaphysical theory. Nominalist theism must 
ultimately collapse into an unstable oscillation between two irreconcilable opposing poles: 
divine causation versus secondary causation, pantheism versus naturalism.
Step Two: From Occasionalism to Pantheism via the Eleatic 
Principle
Having, then, argued that nominalist theism must collapse into occasionalism (whether of the 
libertarian or deterministic variety), all that needs to be shown is that occasionalism entails 
pantheism. This argument requires a crucial additional premise called the Eleatic Principle, 
after the character in Plato’s Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger, who suggests that the essential 
characteristic of being is causal power.57 In contemporary analytic philosophy, the principle 
was resurrected by David Armstrong,58 and has been defended by a range of philosophers, 
though also coming under criticism.59 Colyvan summarises the principle as follows: “This 
principle justifies belief in only those entities to which causal power can be attributed, that 
is, to those entities which can bring about changes in the world.”60 In a modern context, the 
principle serves mainly as a principle of inductive reasoning, as a justification for preferring 
one theory over another. However, the context in the present case is rather different, and 
is closer to what Plato originally had in mind. All orthodox Christians, even if they are 
nominalists, must hold to an ontology of substances. That is, while it is perhaps possible to 
reject the idea that universals are real, while remaining broadly orthodox, it is not possible 
to reject the idea that substance is real, and remain orthodox. Therefore, views which regard 
particulars as nothing more than bundles of universals, which Armstrong calls “bundle 
theories,”61 or which reject the idea of substance in other ways (such as the idealism of David 
Hume), are not viable for the purposes of a Christian metaphysic. It is doubtful whether such 
views could be made compatible with theism of any variety at all.
56 Cited in Michael J. Dodds, Unlocking Divine Action: Contemporary Science and Thomas Aquinas (Washington DC: Catholic University of 
America Press, 2012), 208.
57 Plato, “Sophist,” in Plato, vol. 7, trans. H. N. Fowler, ed. J. Henderson, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
1921), 378–9 (247e).
58 David M. Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
59 Mark Colyvan, “Can the Eleatic Principle Be Justified?,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (1998), 313–36.
60 Colyvan, “Eleatic Principle,” 313.
61 Armstrong, Universals: An Opinionated Introduction, 59–64.
Haig: Was Calvin an Implicit Pantheist? 77
Having accepted an ontology of substances, then, the question becomes, what things 
should be said to be substances, as opposed to mere bundles which form a part of some greater 
substance?62 There is no need to develop a rigid set of criteria to determine this: indeed, it 
might be argued, as in Wittgenstein’s famous example of “what is a game?,” that no such set 
of explicit criteria are possible at all;63 but at best only rough and ready loose guidelines which 
approximate our language usage. That is, our ordinary conceptual division of the world into 
subjects about which we can predicate may not be based upon “principles” which can be 
expressed in language at all (the conceptual structure of language may be transcendental).64 
We do not require the Eleatic Principle, therefore, to be a sufficient condition for identifying 
substance. The question is, however, whether it is at least a necessary condition. That is, 
could there be a substance which had no causal influence on anything else whatsoever?
A rigorous argument for the Eleatic Principle lies outside the scope of this paper. It 
seems, however, that to posit the existence of a substance that had no causal influence upon 
anything whatsoever would render the idea of substance rather meaningless. As has been 
noted, the intuitive appeal of the Eleatic Principle is strong.65 Furthermore, although there are 
some contemporary analytic philosophers who have rejected it, this fact is, for two reasons, 
of little significance in the present context. Firstly, these philosophers have invariably been 
motivated by their explicit commitment to atheistic naturalism, and the primary alternative 
they present is not tenable for a theist: that an entity has to have a spatio-temporal location 
in order to be real.66 Secondly, these philosophers are not confining the principle to the 
question of substances only (or even at all), but are applying it indiscriminately to everything 
in a proposed ontology, including abstract entities, properties, and what might easily be 
considered bundles (or parts of some larger whole) rather than substances. None of their 
objections, therefore, seem telling in the present context. A causally inert substance would 
seem to have no telos or end. It would serve no purpose in the scheme of things.
Given the Eleatic Principle, pantheism follows from occasionalism straightforwardly. 
Occasionalism states that only God’s will is causally efficacious; therefore, by the Eleatic 
Principle, God is the only substance, and only God exists. There is only one infinite substance, 
God. Spinoza was the greatest, and the most systematically precise, philosopher of early 
modern rationalism. Unlike Calvin, Edwards, Descartes, and Malebranche, he was prepared 
to disavow religious orthodoxy and violate confessional boundaries in order to maintain 
rigorous logical consistency; he was the only one of these writers willing to be expelled by 
his community as a heretic. His philosophy represents the final cul-de-sac into which those 
who follow along the path taken by Calvin and Descartes must end. Because participatory 
theism avoids occasionalism, as discussed above, it likewise avoids pantheism. Thus, we are 
62 This question can, on the Platonist view, be rephrased in terms of Form, since whatever has a unified Form is a substance.
63 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations: The German Text, with a Revised English Translation, 3rd ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 
(Malden: Blackwell, 2001), 27e–28e.
64 I have discussed this elsewhere (Haig, “Modernity, ‘Radical Orthodoxy,’ and Cornelius Van Til,” 259–61).
65 Colyvan, “Eleatic Principle,” 133.
66 Colyvan, “Eleatic Principle,” 135.
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left in agreement with Milbank that only the Platonic doctrine of participation is capable of 
“allowing finite things their own integrity.”67
Nominalist Theism and the Necessary Part of the Causal 
Nexus
There is another, quite distinct, problem with nominalist theism with respect to the causal 
“bridge” across the Creator-creation divide. In order for God to be omnipotent, it must be 
the case that certain causal relations necessarily hold true, independently of God’s willing 
them or bringing them to be. If God wills that A, then, given divine omnipotence, A must 
thereby be caused to happen. Hence, an efficient causal relation exists between God’s willing 
A, and A. Since God is omnipotent, such a relation must always exist between God’s will and 
its realised object. The question is, what is it that makes this causal relation hold? What is the 
“bonding” or “agency” between the cause and the effect, known in philosophy as the causal 
nexus?68 It cannot be the case that God himself wills these causal relations to hold, because 
God could not exercise any power unless they already were operational. In other words, 
God cannot be omnipotent by means of willing it to be so. These causal relations (between 
God’s will and its effects) cannot be grounded in God’s will itself. They must hold necessarily, 
and not be created. Whatever establishes these causal relations, therefore, must comprise a 
necessary component of the causal nexus; a part of the causal nexus that possesses aseity, and 
exists eternally and necessarily.
Given that causal relations must have some ontological grounding,69 the response of 
the nominalist theist will no doubt be to try to argue that this necessary part of the causal 
nexus is in some sense an aspect or component of God’s nature. After all, it is the essential 
ingredient of omnipotence, and could be said to be God’s “power.” The problem is that, 
assuming nominalist theism to be true, it is difficult to see how this could be so. The causal 
relations in question are relations between the Creator and the creation. These causal relations 
can only be actualised or exemplified when there is a creation (or, their becoming actualised 
necessarily requires the creation also to become actualised). One might argue, though, that 
while these causal relations themselves hold between God and the creation, and they are 
therefore themselves distinct from the divine essence, nonetheless the ontological grounds 
for these causal relations is completely contained within the divine essence. But given the 
assumptions of nominalist theism, how can something within the divine essence, ground 
something outside of the divine essence, except by means of the very causal relations in 
question? According to nominalist theism, efficient causation is the one and only bridge or 
connection between the otherwise “entirely other” realms of Creator and creation.
67 John Milbank, “Suspending the Material: The Turn of Radical Orthodoxy,” in Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology, ed. J. Milbank, C. 
Pickstock, and G. Ward (London: Routledge, 1999), 1–20, at 3.
68 Mario Bunge, “The Revival of Causality,” in Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey, vol. 2, ed. G. Fløistad (The Hague: Springer, 1982), 
133–55.
69 Theories of causation which deny this, such as Hume’s characterisation of causation as the mere “constant conjunction” of events, are in 
general both implausible and incompatible with theism. See David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Early Modern Texts, 
2008), 29–41, http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/hume1748.pdf, accessed 17/4/2017. 
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There is a way out for nominalist theism in relation to this problem, but it is a very 
unpalatable one. The nominalist theist could abandon traditional theism, and say that, in fact, 
the necessary part of the causal nexus does possess aseity and exist eternally and necessarily 
apart from God. This would be like saying that God requires an eternal stage on which to act. 
Such a claim would resolve this dilemma, at the cost of adopting a non-traditional theism.70
Before moving on, it is worth making explicit why participatory theism avoids this 
problem. As noted above, according to participatory theism, efficient causation is merely 
an aspect of Form. The efficient causal relations that do exist between God and the creation 
are ultimately simply a part or aspect of the highest Form, the Form of the Good, God.71 
They participate in God, and so do the created things which are produced. Thus, there is an 
ontological connection between the created thing and God (in that created things participate 
in God), which provides the foundation for the causal relation between them. According 
to participatory theism, efficient causal relations are not the only “bridge” between God 
and creation. In fact, they are just a secondary aspect of the fundamental bridge, which is 
ontological in nature: participation. Both the causal relations between God and creation, 
and the Form of the created things themselves, are contained eminently in God. From the 
point of view of Form, which includes all efficient causal relations, God’s creation might be 
considered as an emanation. There is no rigid Creator-creation divide; rather, there is a kind 
of Creator-creation overlap.
Conclusion
It has been argued that Fairbairn’s claim that Calvin’s doctrine of God is implicitly pantheistic 
is correct. However, while the problem to which Fairbairn drew our attention is particularly 
visible in Calvin’s theology, it has also been argued that the same defect is present in all forms 
of nominalist theism. The fundamental problem is not Calvin’s claim that God is the sole 
efficient cause. In saying this, Calvin merely made explicit what is, in fact, implicit in all forms 
of nominalist theism, and thereby made the line of argument concluding in pantheism slightly 
more succinct. The real issue is the fact that nominalist theism makes efficient causation the 
only ontological bridge between the Creator and the creation. For a number of reasons which 
have been discussed in this article, efficient causation is not capable of serving this role. Only 
the Platonic doctrine of participation is capable of relating the Creator to the created order in 
a manner which maintains the integrity of both domains.
70 This means that the common criticism of Platonism that it requires a denial that God alone possesses aseity (see Craig, God Over All, 12) 
can be turned against nominalist theism.
71 This leaves out some internal complexities. In Platonism, the realm of the Forms (nous) functions as an intermediary between the Form of 
the Good (the One) and the temporal, created realm. 
